COMPLAINT

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#### INTRODUCTION

- 1. In August 2020, the San Diego Police Department ("SDPD") arrested several participants in a protest against police brutality, confiscated their cell phones, and refused to return them after the participants were released.
- 2. Over a month after those arrests, SDPD admitted it was holding the cell phones and had not sought warrants to search them.
- 3. After arresting Plaintiff Christina Griffin-Jones at a protest against police brutality in September 2020, SDPD confiscated and retained her cell phone far longer than necessary to seek or obtain a search warrant, even assuming the arrest was otherwise justified.
- 4. In requiring a warrant to search a cell phone seized incident to arrest, the Supreme Court recognized the ubiquity and centrality of modern cell phones to daily life, acknowledging they are "minicomputers" with "immense storage capacity" for holding or accessing "detailed information about all aspects of a person's life," including all manner of private, personal, and proprietary data. *Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. 373, 393–96 (2014).
- 5. The data contained on or accessed through a modern cell phone allow police to reconstruct "[t]he sum of an individual's private life" through accessing "millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos," as well as "photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar," contact lists, various apps, and numerous other items. *Id.* at 394.
- 6. Like "the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone," Ms. Griffin-Jones keeps on her "person a digital record of nearly every aspect" of her life "from the mundane to the intimate." *Id.* at 395.
- 7. "Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far *more* than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is." *Id.* at

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- 8. Individuals pervasively rely on cell phones for numerous tasks and facets of daily living, including but not limited to internet access, work and business, social interaction, professional networking, navigation and transportation, shopping, ordering food and meals, and fitness and health.
- 9. Accordingly, "[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person." *Id.* at 393.
- 10. Recognizing the importance of privacy in electronic information, the California Legislature adopted the landmark California Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("CalECPA"), which imposes stringent requirements for warrants to search electronic devices and requires written notice of such warrants.
- 11. SDPD's unjustified and prolonged retention of cell phones seized from protesters is especially alarming to the extent it threatens to invade their associational privacy and thus chill their ability to organize and participate in protests against police brutality and systemic racism. The unjustified retention of cell phones threatens to chill the speech not only of Ms. Griffin-Jones but also of everyone with whom Ms. Griffin-Jones interacted by use of her cell phone, because records of those interactions could be accessed through search of the phone.
- 12. By impounding and retaining Ms. Griffin-Jones's cell phone for a prolonged time without promptly seeking a warrant or providing an opportunity for judicial review, Defendants violated or are violating the United States and California Constitutions. This Court's intervention is urgently necessary to enforce Ms. Griffin-Jones's bedrock constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and deprivation of property without due process.

#### JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 13. The Court has original jurisdiction over Ms. Griffin-Jones's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).
  - 14. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Griffin-Jones's state law

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claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the state law claims are so related to the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

- 15. The Court may award damages and grant declaratory and injunctive relief for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 65, or Calif. Civil Code § 52.1.
- 16. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events that give rise to this action occurred within this district and the defendants reside in this district and state.
- 17. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, all of whom, on information and belief, are residents of the state of California.

### **PARTIES**

- 18. Plaintiff Christina Griffin-Jones is a resident of the State of California and County of San Diego.
- 19. Defendant City of San Diego ("City") is a duly organized and existing municipality under California law, located in San Diego County, California. The City has direct supervisory authority over SDPD and its officers, and SDPD policies are City policies for purposes of municipal liability.
- 20. J. Doe Nos. 1-25 (collectively, "Officers") are SDPD officers employed by the City of San Diego. The identities of the Officers are currently unknown to Ms. Griffin-Jones, who reserves the right to amend this complaint to identify them when such information becomes available through discovery or otherwise. The Officers are sued in their individual and official capacities.
- 21. At all times relevant to this action, the Officers were agents and employees of the City acting under color of state law and within the course and scope of their agency and employment. At all times relevant to this action, the Officers were knowingly aiding and abetting or acting in concert with each other as to all acts or omissions alleged herein.

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#### **FACTS PLEADED**

- 22. Video of police killings and other forms of police violence, often taken by cell phone cameras, have provided evidence and information that has helped to mobilize support for protests and the broader "Black Lives Matter" and racial justice movements.
- 23. Ms. Griffin-Jones, like the vast majority of the adult population of the United States, also relies on a cell phone to navigate daily life in many ways, ranging from communicating with friends and family to using ride sharing software to conducting business.
- 24. Like those of many other persons, Ms. Griffin-Jones's cell phone stores or provides a means to access vast amounts of private, personal, or proprietary information.
- 25. On or about September 23, 2020, Ms. Griffin-Jones attended a protest in the City of San Diego calling for justice for Breonna Taylor, who was killed by police in Louisville, Kentucky.
- 26. During the September 23 protest, Ms. Griffin-Jones was arrested by one or more SDPD officers.
- 27. SDPD officers seized all belongings Ms. Griffin-Jones had on her person when she was arrested, including her cell phone.
- 28. SDPD did not seek or obtain Ms. Griffin-Jones's consent to seize, retain, or search her cell phone.
- 29. SDPD did not seek or obtain a warrant to seize, retain, or search Ms. Griffin-Jones's cell phone at, near, or after the time when Ms. Griffin-Jones was arrested.
- 30. No exigent circumstances existed that would justify seizing, retaining, or searching Ms. Griffin-Jones's cell phone without a warrant or consent.
  - 31. No criminal charges have been filed against Ms. Griffin-Jones.
- 32. There is no reason to believe Ms. Griffin-Jones's cell phone ever contained evidence material or relevant to any charge for which Ms. Griffin-Jones was arrested or is under investigation, and therefore there was no probable cause to search, seize, or retain Ms. Griffin-Jones's phone.

- 33. There is no reason to believe Ms. Griffin-Jones's cell phone was itself the instrument or means of committing any criminal offense.
- 34. Ms. Griffin-Jones was booked into jail following her arrest. All of the property she had on her person when she was arrested, including her cell phone, was impounded upon her arrest.
- 35. Ms. Griffin-Jones was eventually released from jail following her arrest and booking.
- 36. When Ms. Griffin-Jones was released from jail, most of her property was returned to her, but her cell phone was not.
- 37. Ms. Griffin-Jones sought return of her personal property that was impounded, including her cell phone, from SDPD.
  - 38. SDPD did not return her cell phone to her.
- 39. SDPD officers seized cell phones belonging to other persons arrested at the August, September, or other protests, and SDPD impounded those cell phones for a prolonged time without seeking search warrants.
- 40. On September 24, 2020, counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter ("cell phone seizure letter") to SDPD Chief David Nisleit, among others, expressing concern about the prolonged duration of the seizure of phones from protesters who were arrested at the August 28 protest.
- 41. As a result of the cell phone seizure letter, on September 29, 2020, SDPD indicated that it would finally start returning some protesters' phones, more than a month after the August 28 protest.
- 42. Following the cell phone seizure letter, SDPD informed certain protesters who had been arrested that SDPD would return their cell phones, and those protesters have since retrieved their phones.
  - 43. However, SDPD has not returned Ms. Griffin-Jones's phone to her.
- 44. Ms. Griffin-Jones has not received any notice in writing or otherwise that a search warrants has been sought, issued, or executed to search her cell phone.

- 45. According to SDPD policy, "All property discovered, gathered, or received in the course of performing Departmental duties that is determined to be of some evidentiary or monetary value shall be impounded and physically deposited in the Property Room by the end of shift." SDPD Policy 3.02 § V(A).
- 46. SDPD policy provides, "Detectives must maintain a system to track evidence/property associated to cases assigned to them.... All new impounds are assigned a retention period automatically based on criteria predetermined by the Property Room. If a detective requests the retention period be extended, that date will change." SDPD Policy 3.02 § XII(F).
- 47. By vesting the investigating detective with unfettered discretion to extend the seizure of impounded cell phones, SDPD policy authorized the prolonged detention of Ms. Griffin-Jones's phone without a warrant, consent, exigent circumstances, or judicial review.
- 48. SDPD policy 3.02 § XII(G)(1)(a) provides that property impounded as evidence in misdemeanor cases shall generally be retained "until the case has been adjudicated," or until "[o]ne year after the offense date, if the City Attorney's Office has not filed charges, based on the statute of limitations," or until "[o]ver 3 years since the arrest date."
- 49. SDPD policy 3.02 § XII(G)(1)(b) provides that property impounded as evidence in misdemeanor/felony "wobbler" cases shall generally be retained "until the case has been adjudicated," or until "[o]ver 5 years since arrest date."
- 50. SDPD policy 3.02 § XII(G)(1)(c) provides that property impounded as evidence in felony cases shall generally be retained "until the case has been adjudicated."
- 51. SDPD policy does not recognize the unique nature of cell phones as digital storage and access devices or distinguish between cell phones and other forms of impounded property, for example a weapon used in an assault, that do not contain or reveal immense amounts of personal, sensitive, or proprietary data.
  - 52. SDPD policy does not contain guidelines or criteria for determining whether

a cell phone may be impounded for the purpose of seeking a search warrant based on probable cause to believe the phone contains evidence of a crime, or for otherwise believing the phone should be used as evidence in a prosecution.

- 53. By authorizing retention of impounded cell phones for an extended time without regard to the unique nature of cell phones as digital storage and access devices or stating guidelines or criteria for determining whether cell phones may be impounded to seek a warrant or for use as evidence in a prosecution, the foregoing SDPD policy or policies caused the prolonged seizure of Ms. Griffin-Jones's phone without a warrant, consent, exigent circumstances, or judicial review.
- 54. On information and belief, SDPD officers routinely seize and retain for prolonged times the cell phones of arrested persons, including but not limited to persons arrested at the August and September 2020 protests discussed above, without a warrant or judicial review pursuant to a widespread or longstanding practice or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure of the City which caused the violations of Ms. Griffin-Jones's constitutional rights arising from seizure and prolonged retention of her cell phone.
- 55. Despite the ubiquity of cell phones possessed by arrested persons, the City failed to train SDPD officers on the usual and recurring issues of (a) seizing cell phones from arrested persons; (b) promptly seeking search warrants to justify impounding said phones; or (c) promptly ensuring an opportunity for judicial review of the seizure of impounded property.
- 56. By failing to train SDPD officers about constitutional limits on the amount of time cell phones seized from arrested persons may be retained without seeking a warrant or providing judicial review, the City was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk that its policies were inadequate to prevent constitutional violations arising from such retention or the known and obvious consequences of its failure to train SDPD officers adequately.
  - 57. The City's deliberately indifferent failure to train SDPD officers or otherwise

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prevent SDPD officers from violating the Constitution caused the violations of Ms. Griffin-Jones's constitutional rights arising from prolonged seizures of her cell phone without a warrant, consent, exigent circumstances, or judicial review.

- 58. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Ms. Griffin-Jones and Defendants regarding Ms. Griffin-Jones's right to possess, access, and use her cell phone, as well as damages incurred as a result of the seizure of her phone.
- 59. Ms. Griffin-Jones has submitted a timely administrative claim to the City and reserves the right to amend this complaint to seek damages for any state law claims if the City denies said claim.

#### **CLAIMS**

### **FIRST CLAIM**

## 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Unreasonable Seizure

- 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations above and incorporates them by reference here.
- 61. By impounding and retaining Plaintiff's phone for a prolonged time after her arrest without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, Defendants violated or are violating Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure of her property, papers, or effects.
- 62. The City is liable for violating Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights because the violations were caused by the City's official policies or settled customs and practices.
- 63. The City is liable for violating Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights because the violations were caused by the City's deliberately indifferent failure to train SDPD officers or prevent SDPD officers from committing such violations.
- 64. As a proximate and foreseeable result of Defendants' violations of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, Plaintiff has suffered, is suffering, and will continue to suffer damages.

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#### SECOND CLAIM

## 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Due Process Violation

- 65. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations above and incorporates them by reference here.
- 66. By impounding and retaining Plaintiff's cell phone for a prolonged time after her arrest and release from jail without judicial review or other notice and opportunity for hearing before a neutral magistrate, Defendants violated or are violating Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law.
- 67. The City is liable for violating Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights because the violations were caused by the City's official policies or settled customs and practices.
- 68. The City is liable for violating Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights because the violations were cause by the City's deliberately indifferent failure to train SDPD officers or prevent SDPD officers from committing such violations.
- 69. As a proximate and foreseeable result of Defendants' violations of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights, Plaintiff has suffered, is suffering, and will continue to suffer damages.

## THIRD CLAIM

# Calif. Const. Art. I, § 13 – Unreasonable Seizure

- 70. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations above and incorporates them by reference here.
- 71. By impounding and retaining Plaintiff's cell phone for a prolonged time without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, Defendants violated or are violating Plaintiff's rights under Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution against unreasonable seizure of her property, papers, or effects.

#### FOURTH CLAIM

## Calif. Const. Art. I, § 7 – Due Process Violation

72. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations above and incorporates them

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73. By impounding and retaining Plaintiff's cell phone for a prolonged time after her arrest and release from jail without judicial review or other notice and opportunity for hearing before a neutral magistrate, Defendants violated or are violating Plaintiff's rights to due process of law under Article I, section 7 of the California Constitution.

#### FIFTH CLAIM

## Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b) – Bane Act

- 74. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations above and incorporates them by reference here.
- 75. In violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(b), Defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's state and federal constitutional rights against unreasonable seizure and retention of her cell phone without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, as well as prolonged retention of her cell phone without judicial review.
- 76. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to "injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief." Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(c).

### **SIXTH CLAIM**

## **Recovery of Personal Property (Claim and Delivery)**

- 77. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations above and incorporates them by reference here.
  - 78. Plaintiff is entitled to possession of her cell phone.
  - 79. Defendants are in wrongful possession of Plaintiff's cell phone.
  - 80. Plaintiff demanded return of her cell phone.
  - 81. Defendants have failed to return Plaintiff's cell phone.
  - 82. Plaintiff is entitled to immediate return of her cell phone.

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1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter judgment against 3 Defendants as follows: Declaring that the retention of Plaintiff's cell phone without warrant, consent, 4 5 exigent circumstances, or judicial review was unlawful; Requiring Defendants to return the cell phone belonging to Plaintiff; 6 7 Enjoining Defendants and Defendants' officers, agents, servants, and employees and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with any of the foregoing 8 9 persons from maintaining possession of any data or information obtained from searching Plaintiff's phone; 10 11 Entering an order voiding any warrant, order, or process issued for the search of her cell phone and compelling destruction of any information obtained in violation of 12 13 CalECPA, the California Constitution, or United States Constitution; 14 Awarding Plaintiff nominal, actual, and punitive damages, although no punitive 15 damages are sought against the City and no damages are currently sought for state law violations; 16 17 Awarding Plaintiff costs and attorney fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, 42 U.S.C. § 18 1988, Cal. Civil Code § 52.1, or any other applicable law; and 19 Awarding other such relief as the Court deems just and proper. 20 21 DATED: January 7, 2021 Respectfully submitted, 22 23 By: *s/Brody McBride* 24 Singleton Law Firm Attornevs for Plaintiff 25 26 27 28 12